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THE IMPACT OF ANALYST-INDUCED MISINFORMATION ON
1
THE REQUIREMENTS ELICITATION PROCESS
Radha Appan
Nance College of Business Administration, Cleveland State University, 2121 Euclid Avenue,
Cleveland, OH 44115 U.S.A. {r.appan@csuohio.edu}

Glenn J. Browne
Rawls College of Business Administration, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409 U.S.A. {glenn.browne@ttu.edu}

Information requirements determination (IRD) is concerned with developing accurate requirements for a
proposed system, primarily by eliciting information from users and other organizational stakeholders. In this
paper we build and test theory concerning a significant threat to the accuracy of information requirements,
termed the misinformation effect. Misinformation is distorted, false, or other erroneous or misleading
information that does not reflect the true state of the world or state of mind of the person communicating the
information. The misinformation effect refers to the tendency of people to recall misleading or false information
introduced to them following an event instead of original material learned or observed at the time the event
occurred. During user–analyst communication in the IRD process, analysts may introduce misinformation in
their discussions with users. We use the misinformation effect literature to hypothesize that in such circumstances users are likely to recall misinformation introduced by analysts rather than their true beliefs and
knowledge of facts. Additionally, we use literature in social psychology to hypothesize that the misinformation
effect will be stronger when misinformation is introduced using a social technique rather than a nonsocial
technique. We conducted an experiment to test the misinformation effect in the requirements elicitation
process. Results indicated that (1) introduction of misinformation reduces the accuracy of requirements
provided by users, and (2) social techniques (interviews) are more vulnerable to the misinformation effect than
nonsocial techniques (surveys). Our research contributes to the information systems literature by identifying
an important reason that requirements provided by users may be inaccurate, and to IRD practice by identifying
important dilemmas caused by the misinformation effect as well as potential solutions. We also contribute to
the psychology literature by demonstrating the existence of the misinformation effect with users’ experiential
factual knowledge and beliefs in a business context, and by aiding in understanding the underlying causes of
the misinformation effect. We discuss implications of our findings and directions for future research to address
challenges resulting from the misinformation effect.
Keywords: Information requirements determination, misinformation effect, user–analyst communication, user
participation, elicitation techniques, systems development
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Introduction
Systems development success is highly contingent on the
accuracy of requirements gathered from users and other stake
holders during the information requirements determination
(IRD) process (Davis 1982; Hickey and Davis 2004;
Wetherbe 1991). The accuracy of requirements depends in
large part on the effectiveness of the communication between
the systems analyst and the users (Bostrom 1989; Gallivan
and Keil 2003; Hanssen and Faegre 2008; He and King 2008;
Valusek and Fryback 1987). In this paper we build and test
theory concerning a significant threat to the accuracy of infor
mation requirements that occurs during user–analyst com
munication, termed the misinformation effect.
Misinformation refers to distorted, false, or other erroneous or
misleading information that does not reflect the true state of
the world or true state of mind of the person communicating
the information (Fox 1983; Zhou and Zhang 2007). Misinfor
mation is a general phenomenon in human behavior, as people
provide misinformation unintentionally or intentionally (that
is, by lying) all the time (see, e.g., DePaulo et al. 1996). The
misinformation effect refers to the tendency to recall mis
leading or false post-event information instead of original
material learned or observed at the time an event occurred
(Loftus 1979, 2005; Loftus, Miller, and Burns 1978; Saunders
and MacLeod 2002). Research has demonstrated that the
introduction of cues containing misinformation (misleading or
erroneous information), for example, to an eyewitness to an
event, can lead to subsequent recall of this misinformation
rather than the information that was originally observed and
committed to memory (Gabbert et al. 2004; Johnson 1994;
Saunders and MacLeod 2002). The effect has been investi
gated extensively in the context of eyewitness memory,
memory for autobiographical events, memory for semantic
information (e.g., word pairs), and memory of customers for
product-related stimuli. However, the impact of the misinfor
mation effect on an individual’s beliefs and his or her ability
to recall factual information learned over a period of time,
which are the types of information elicited during IRD, have
not been investigated.
Requirements determination is a key stage of systems
development, since so many subsequent activities depend on
accurate requirements. There are numerous methodologies
that can be applied to gather requirements, and different
assumptions are made in each methodology. In this paper, we
research the situation in which a systems analyst has primary
control over the requirements determination process and
elicits requirements from traditional software users. Regard
less of methodological approach and assumptions, there are
several reasons to believe that the IRD process is highly

vulnerable to the misinformation effect. First, analysts and
users often have different mental models and speak “different
languages,” both of which increase the likelihood of
communicating misinformation (Alvarez 2002; Bednar and
Welch 2008; Bostrom 1989; Browne and Ramesh 2002;
Orlikowski and Gash 1994). Second, requirements elicitation
necessarily requires considerable recall of information by
users, regardless of whether they are being interviewed or
surveyed or are reacting to prototypes (Byrd et al. 1992;
Davis 1982; Jain et al. 2003; Moody et al. 1998). As noted,
recall processes have been shown to be vulnerable to the
misinformation effect. Finally, for motivational reasons,
analysts may consciously or subconsciously introduce mis
information to influence users to agree with them (Alvarez
2002; Lin and Silva 2005; Markus and Bjørn-Andersen 1987;
Myers and Young 1997; Robey and Markus 1984). Thus, it
is critical to examine the potential impact of misinformation
on the information acquired during IRD. If the misinforma
tion effect is observed, it will have important implications for
the design of elicitation techniques, strategies for technique
selection, user participation during IRD, and user–analyst
communication in general.
Our investigation has three goals. First, we use the misinfor
mation effect literature to develop our own theoretical basis
to argue that when asked to provide requirements, users are
likely to recall misinformation introduced by analysts rather
than their true beliefs and knowledge of facts. Second, we
seek to develop an improved understanding of the misinfor
mation effect by exploring the underlying causes of the
phenomenon during the requirements elicitation process.
Specifically, we explore whether the phenomenon is due to
inherent cognitive limitations of humans (Loftus 1979) or is
caused by the common desire of individuals to appear to be in
agreement with others (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Third, we
investigate the differences between social (interviews) and
nonsocial (surveys) elicitation techniques when misinforma
tion is present. All three goals are aimed at building and
testing theory. The first and third goals have not been
investigated empirically before in any context. The second
goal is new to the systems development literature and will
help build a better theoretical understanding of various
phenomena in IRD and systems development generally.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next
sections provide background and describe our theoretical
argument as to why the IRD process is susceptible to the
misinformation effect. Next, the methodology for the study
is described, followed by the results of an experiment. The
paper concludes with implications of the findings for theory
and practice.

Background
Information Requirements Determination in
Systems Development
Information requirements determination is the process by
which systems analysts assess and model the needs for a
proposed information system (Davis 1982; Wetherbe 1991).
In most systems development efforts, the primary source of
requirements is people who use the current system and/or who
will use the proposed system. Common methods for eliciting
requirements include personal interviews, surveys or ques
tionnaires, observation, joint application development (JAD)
sessions, and protocol analysis (Goguen and Linde 1993;
Kendall and Kendall 2010; Liou and Chen 1994; Robertson
and Robertson 1999). The requirements determination pro
cess thus may involve both social (e.g., interviews) and
nonsocial (e.g., surveys) techniques.
Studies that have emphasized the role of analysts in facili
tating and improving requirements elicitation have focused
primarily on the elicitation techniques that can be employed,
such as structured and unstructured interviews, protocol
analysis, laddered grids, and card sorting (Agarwal and
Tanniru 1990; Burton et al. 1987; Moody et al. 1998).
Although these studies recognize the need to understand how
humans store and use knowledge to facilitate recall of
accurate requirements (Best 1989), they do not emphasize the
need to understand factors that inhibit users’ ability to provide
accurate requirements. Although there are many possible
causes of inaccurate requirements (e.g., lack of communica
tion among the relevant parties, inability of users to articulate
requirements, unwillingness of users to provide require
ments), misinformation potentially inhibits accurate require
ments, and that is our focus in the current study.
Requirements can be elicited throughout the systems devel
opment process, and new requirements sometimes emerge
even late in the process. In systems development methodo
logies that use well-defined stages, typically termed waterfall
or planned methods, the primary requirements gathering
occurs during the analysis phase, after systems planning and
selection and before systems design (George et al. 2006). In
development methodologies often referred to collectively as
agile, requirements are gathered on an on-going basis as users
react to prototypes or other types of models of the proposed
software (e.g., Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004; Beck 1999;
Boehm 2002; Lee and Xia 2010) (although it should be noted
that even agile methods typically start by gathering a basic set
of requirements). Both waterfall and agile methods are used
extensively in contemporary systems development. Although
agile methods have grown in popularity over the past decade

and continue to grow, industry surveys show that the waterfall
methodology is still used in a large majority of systems
development projects; mature agile development methods are
reportedly used in only 15 to 25 percent of projects (Light
2009; Norton 2008). As a basic psychological phenomenon,
the misinformation effect, if it occurs, should be present in
any type of development methodology. However, in the pre
sent research we assume the use of a waterfall methodology.
We include implications of our findings for agile methodo
logies in the discussion section.

User–Analyst Communication in IRD
The success of the IRD process depends to a great extent on
users and other stakeholders communicating accurate
requirements to analysts. Prior studies have emphasized the
importance of user participation for improving the IRD
process and ultimate system success (Hunton and Beeler
1997; Hwang and Thorn 1999; Newman and Sabherwal
1996). However, empirical results of studies examining the
role of user participation have been mixed, and researchers
now recognize that the impact of user participation is
dependent upon numerous contingency factors (Gallivan and
Keil 2003; Hartwick and Barki 1994; Hunton and Beeler
1997; McKeen et al. 1994). One such factor that has been
recognized as essential for productive user participation is
effective communication between users and analysts. How
ever, models of user participation usually assume that effec
tive communication occurs and thus do not fully describe the
user–analyst communication process (Gallivan and Keil 2003;
Hartwick and Barki 2001; Hunton and Beeler 1997; Newman
and Noble 1990; Robey et al. 1989).
Gallivan and Keil (2003) proposed a four-stage process model
of communication between users and analysts. In their model,
the first two stages of the communication (users formulate the
message and users transmit the message) primarily involve
users’ cognition, while the last two stages (analysts receive
and interpret the message, and analysts set priorities and take
action) involve the cognitions and behavior of analysts. One
important consideration not highlighted by Gallivan and Keil
is that users’ formulation of the message to be communicated
to the analysts is affected by the cues used by the analysts.
Specifically, users’ formulation of the message is largely
contingent on their ability to recall relevant information, and
their ability to recall relevant information is influenced by the
cues provided by the analysts. Any erroneous information
(misinformation) in the cues provided by the analyst could
result in users providing inaccurate requirements consistent
with the misinformation in the cues. This inaccurate infor
mation may then make its way into requirements documents
and system design.

Misinformation Effect
The misinformation effect has traditionally been examined in
the context of eyewitnesses’ memory for the details of a
witnessed event. The misinformation effect involves mis
reporting of information as a result of exposure to misleading
information received after the actual event (Loftus et al.
1989). For example, a pedestrian who witnesses an auto
accident (event of interest) may be interviewed by the police
after the accident. During the interview (post-event), the
interviewer may incorrectly suggest (e.g., in a leading ques
tion) that the vehicle involved in the accident encountered a
stop sign, when in fact only a yield sign was present. During
subsequent interviews, the eyewitness is likely to recall the
stop sign rather than the yield sign (Loftus, Miller, and Burns
1978). This exemplifies the misinformation effect.
Much research has demonstrated that exposure to post-event
information can lead to distortion of eyewitnesses’ memories
(Bekerian and Bowers 1983; Belli 1988; Bonto and Payne
1991; Ceci et al. 1988; Wagenaar and Boer 1987; Zaragoza et
al. 1987). The findings of this stream of research have had
important implications for the legal system, which recognizes,
for example, the need to sequester witnesses while others
testify to avoid memory impairment (Federal Rules of Evi
dence §615). Evidence of the misinformation effect in the
eyewitness memory paradigm has triggered research in
several other domains interested in human memory and recall.
For instance, research on autobiographical memory has
demonstrated that inconsistent information learned subsequent
to the original event can explain some of the common errors
that arise during recall of autobiographical events (Neisser
1981; Schooler and Tanaka 1991). Similar results have been
found in studies involving tests of memory for semantic infor
mation (Saunders and MacLeod 2002). Recently, findings
from the misinformation literature have been extended to
studies on advertising. In this context, it has been found that
post-experience advertisements alter episodic information
learned by a consumer during direct experience (e.g., tasting
a sample of orange juice), and thus the misinformation effect
concept has had important implications for social policy on
deceptive advertising (Braun and Loftus 1998; Cowley and
Janus 2004). In sum, numerous empirical studies have estab
lished the presence of the misinformation effect during recall,
and there is little doubt that misleading information presented
to people leads to erroneous reporting of actual event-related
information.
Although the IRD process relies to a great extent on the
ability of users to recall accurate requirements, the implica
tions of the misinformation effect on requirements gathered
during IRD have not been examined. The IRD process

involves recall not only from episodic memory (similar to
what is examined in the eyewitness memory and other para
digms) but also beliefs of users formed over a period of time
and knowledge of facts gained through their experiences.
Since experiential factual knowledge and beliefs have not
been investigated to date in the misinformation effect litera
ture, simply applying the findings of that literature to the IRD
context is inappropriate. Further, as we noted in the intro
duction and elaborate upon in the next section, the nature of
the IRD process makes it highly vulnerable to the misinfor
mation effect.

Theory Development and Hypotheses
Misinformation Effect and IRD
The success of the IRD process hinges on two groups: the
users who possess the relevant information and the analysts
who generally trigger, direct, and control the process (Alvarez
2002; Tan 1994). Using a variety of elicitation techniques,
analysts direct users’ attention toward relevant and critical
issues (Alvarez 2002; Beath and Orlikowski 1994; Davidson
2002; Tan 1994). Given the role of analysts during this
process, it is possible that they may introduce, intentionally or
unintentionally, misleading or false information. The chance
of introducing this misinformation is significant since analysts
and users often do not share common mental models and
interpretive schemes (Alvarez 2002; Bostrom 1989; Davidson
2002; Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Walz et al. 1993). For
example, Davidson (2002) noted that different technological
frames of reference of users and analysts direct their attention
and cause information to be filtered in particular ways during
IRD, ultimately affecting their understanding of the require
ments. Also, analysts and users often possess different back
grounds, since analysts are trained in information systems and
allied fields while users are trained in functional business
domains. Differing mental models, backgrounds, and goals
often cause misunderstandings and lead to difficulties in
interpreting information conveyed by one person to another,
which may result in the unintentional introduction of misin
formation (Bednar and Welch 2008). Analysts may also
simply make mistakes in their discussions with users that
cause misinformation to be introduced unintentionally.
In addition, analysts may intentionally introduce misinforma
tion (sometimes referred to as disinformation; Hernon 1995).
When misinformation is introduced intentionally, it is related
to the concept of deception (see Buller and Burgoon 1996;
DePaulo et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2001). In IRD, for
example, the goals of analysts can lead them to intentionally
withhold information or introduce misinformation during the

IRD process. For instance, while users may desire a userfriendly interface, analysts may focus on compatibility with
existing IS infrastructure (Lin and Silva 2005; see also Robey
and Markus 1984), and analysts may intentionally introduce
misinformation to convince users to agree with analysts’
goals. Further, the differing backgrounds and mental models
of analysts and users noted above may also cause one party or
both (analysts or users—a point to which we return in the
“Discussion” section) to exploit the knowledge differences to
intentionally introduce misinformation.
The IRD process is particularly vulnerable to the intentional
introduction of misinformation because analysts usually have
primary control over the process. There are many examples
discussed in the literature of opportunities for analysts to use
their control to influence user requirements (in a variety of
ways, including introducing misinformation). For example,
as noted by Alvarez (2002, p. 103),
the analyst is poised to control the interview, ask the
questions and determine what gets talked about….
they identify what constitutes information, what gets
documented and included as a requirement. They
assume the gatekeeper role to some degree which
provides them with authority to make decisions
about the shape and form of the new information
system.
Similar observations have been made by numerous other
authors (e.g., Beath and Orlikowski 1994, p. 372; Markus and
Bjørn-Andersen 1987, p. 499). Robey and Markus (1984, pp.
10-11) provide a vivid description of the potential for
intentional introduction of misinformation by analysts when
they control the process:
For example, in performing the feasibility study…
systems professionals may strategically state
“truths” about project costs and requirements. Their
expert knowledge and position in the cycle allows
them to represent data about user needs, implemen
tation alternatives, and cost–benefit analyses in ways
that may be advantageous for themselves and
disadvantageous for users.
There is also case study evidence available concerning
analyst-introduced misinformation in systems development
practice. For example, Lin and Silva (2005, p. 58) describe
the following findings in their case study of the adoption of
e-mail software in an organization.
Through engaging the user group in a discussion of
the definition of the e-mail system and its technical
feasibility, the project team successfully changed the

user group’s initial choice [BeyondMail] to Group
Wise. Our data show that the project team deliber
ately used abstract concepts and technical jargon to
muddy the user group’s understanding of the project
and their expectations of the new system.
Urquhart (2001) provides a second example of the potential
introduction of misinformation. In describing a user’s con
cerns about his relationship with the systems analyst, Urqu
hart (2001, p. 255) states “he clearly felt at a disadvantage
when dealing with an IT section that seemed to use their
expertise as a defence.” She goes on to quote the user as
follows:
there is always this big mystery about what goes on
in Information Services and you’re really, in a lot of
cases, in a take it or leave sort of situation because
you don’t have the expertise or the knowledge to
argue the position and say “it’s not that hard, why
don’t you just do this, this, and this?” You’ve really
got to take it at face value what you’re told, and that
might be because they simply don’t want to do it.
In summary, this background provides ample evidence for the
potential occurrence of the misinformation effect during the
IRD process. We now use this discussion to develop our first
set of hypotheses concerning potential misinformation effects.
We have demonstrated the theoretical vulnerability of the IRD
process to misinformation. The prior research on the misin
formation effect in the psychology literature described above
leads us to hypothesize that analyst-introduced misinforma
tion will result in lower accuracy of information provided by
users. Because facts and beliefs are both important aspects of
users’ domain knowledge, and because the misinformation
effect may impact them differently, we have generated
separate hypotheses for the two constructs. Therefore, it is
hypothesized2 that
H1a:

In responding to factual questions, users who have
received misinformation from analysts are more
likely to provide inaccurate answers than those who
did not receive any misinformation.

H1b:

In responding to belief-related statements, users
who have received misinformation from analysts are
more likely to provide responses that are aligned
with the misinformation than those who did not
receive any misinformation.

2

All hypotheses are stated in the alternative form.

Examining the role of the misinformation effect during IRD
can provide useful insights into the reasons for inaccurate
requirements that are often gathered during systems devel
opment. However, to understand the consequences of the
misinformation effect and how best to prevent their occur
rence, it is important to understand the mechanisms under
lying the effect. The next section explores the causes of the
misinformation effect identified in the literature and presents
relevant hypotheses in the context of this study.

Potential Causes of the Misinformation
Effect During the IRD Process
Although the misinformation effect is well established as a
psychological phenomenon, no consensus has emerged
regarding its interpretation. There has been considerable
debate as to whether people who receive misleading infor
mation genuinely believe it. In studying the causes, most
researchers have viewed misinformation as either a purely
cognitive phenomenon or as a social psychological
phenomenon.
Taking a cognitive perspective, Loftus and her colleagues
(e.g., Loftus et al. 1989; Loftus et al. 1978) argued that
misinformation “updates” the previously formed memory for
an event such that the memory trace of the event detail is
overwritten and destroyed and the representation of the mis
information becomes an inseparable part of the original
memory. They posit that misinformation reduces the person’s
ability to remember event details and results in memory
impairment (Lindsay 1990). The tests used under this para
digm usually involve a three-stage procedure for studying
eyewitnesses’ reactions to misleading information. Subjects
are first shown the visual event (in the form of pictures or
video), then receive a narrative that contains misleading
suggestions about the event details, and finally take a memory
test for those event details (Lindsay 1990). Research has
demonstrated that individuals exposed to misleading infor
mation are likely to report such misinformation confidently on
subsequent memory tests.
The memory impairment hypothesis advocated by Loftus and
her colleagues was challenged by subsequent researchers who
hypothesized alternative mechanisms that could explain the
misinformation effect. McCloskey and Zaragoza (1985) chal
lenged the memory impairment hypothesis based on several
different arguments, including a demand effect argument. The
demand effect refers to the tendency of participants to respond
to stimuli in a manner consistent with what they perceive to
be the expectations of the experimenter (Weinberg et al.
1983). Participants often adjust their responses to maintain

social desirability. McCloskey and Zaragoza suggested that
subjects exposed to misinformation would perform worse than
those in a control condition even in the absence of any mem
ory impairment suggested by Loftus et al. (1978). Further,
they contended that subjects in the misinformation experi
ments were often led to believe that the narrative was accurate
and/or were told that the narrative was developed by a
professor who had carefully viewed the slides. Therefore,
simply to demonstrate to the experimenter that they were
paying attention during the experiment and remembered the
event details from the slides as well as the narrative, or simply
to align themselves with the perceived expectations of the
experimenter, subjects may base their responses on informa
tion they knew was obtained from the narrative (Lindsay
1990; Weingardt et al. 1995). Through a series of empirical
studies, McCloskey and Zaragoza claimed to have demon
strated that the memory for an original event is not updated or
impaired by the introduction of misinformation. Later
researchers concluded that McCloskey and Zaragoza’s (1985;
Zaragoza et al. 1987) findings were largely the result of the
demand effect (e.g., Lindsay 1990; Weingardt et al. 1995).
In an effort to circumvent the demand characteristics issue,
Lindsay (1990) developed a new procedure based on what is
termed the “logic of opposition” paradigm, which is useful in
determining the extent to which demand characteristics con
tribute to a phenomenon under study. The “opposition” refers
to providing subjects with information and then asking them
to ignore that information in a subsequent recall task (Lindsay
1990). Lindsay’s new procedure involved three phases. The
first two phases, showing pictures of the original event and
presenting a narrative that contained misinformation about the
original event, were similar to previous procedures employed
to investigate misinformation. However, during the third
phase, which involves the test of memory for details of the
original event, subjects were instructed that any information
obtained from the narrative was incorrect and should not be
reported in the memory test (i.e., subjects were told to ignore
the misinformation previously introduced) (Weingardt et al.
1994). Given the warning to ignore the narrative, demand
characteristics conflict with genuine memory impairment
(Weingardt et al. 1995). That is, demand effects in this case
should result in subjects ignoring the misinformation so as to
conform to the instructions. However, the results of Lind
say’s study revealed that subjects sometimes remembered
suggested details without being able to remember their source
and based their responses on the misinformation from the
narrative despite the warning to ignore such misinformation.
These results, along with findings from other research (e.g.,
Belli 1989; Weingardt et al. 1983; Weinberg et al. 1995),
established that the misinformation effect is not simply due to
the demand effect and that misinformation has the potential to
corrupt an individual’s memory for event details.

Given the findings in other contexts that misinformation may
be due to both memory impairment and demand effects, we
argue that it is essential to examine both explanations in the
IRD context. However, there are differences between other
contexts and IRD. Unlike participants in eyewitness memory
and other paradigms, users’ factual knowledge in the IRD
context is often a result of multiple exposures over long
periods of time. Thus, we hypothesize that it is unlikely that
a user’s memory for such factual knowledge will be updated
by the introduction of misinformation. However, beliefs are
more subjective in nature and relatively more malleable.
Thus, misinformation received from a reliable source is more
likely to influence one’s beliefs. Therefore, it is hypothesized
that
H2a:

Memory impairment does not explain the influence
of misinformation on the accuracy of factual
requirements provided by users.

Most of the studies examining the misinformation effect have
focused on eyewitnesses’ memory for information presented
using video clips or narratives. However, very few studies
have examined the misinformation effect when misinfor
mation is introduced by a “social source,” often a confederate
who watches the video along with the participant, discusses
the details subsequently with him or her, and introduces mis
information during the course of this discussion (Gabbert et
al. 2003; Gabbert et al. 2004; Highhouse and Bottrill 1995;
Wright et al. 2000). These few studies have found high rates
(70 to 75 percent) of conformity with the misinformation in
participants’ responses. However, these studies also ulti
mately test for the misinformation effect using only a postevent survey and the focus of inquiry has always been eventrelated information recently viewed by the participant.

Requirements Gathering Techniques
and the Misinformation Effect

The social influence literature provides additional important
background for elicitation techniques. It is common for
people to assume that information shared during a normal
discussion is accurate and truthful (Gabbert et al. 2004;
Swann et al. 1982). People also generally want to seem
agreeable and likeable to others and to avoid appearing to be
a “trouble maker” (Gabbert et al. 2004), a factor often referred
to as “social desirability distortion” (Richman et al. 1999). In
the context of IRD, since the misinformation may be intro
duced and subsequently elicited by the same person (the
analyst), it seems likely that users will conform to the misin
formation introduced as a way to be agreeable. A variety of
factors inherent in social techniques could further increase the
extent of conformity with misinformation. For instance, in
social situations additional information is often conveyed
through nonverbal influences such as eye contact and facial
expressions, and social cues such as perceived credibility and
trustworthiness are often present (Gabbert et al. 2004). These
nonverbal cues can unintentionally change the results in a
way that is consistent with the expectations of the experi
menter (Gabbert et al. 2004; Rosenthal 1969). Gabbert et al.
(2004) found that a social technique (watching a video of a
robbery with another person—a confederate—present)
resulted in more misinformation reported by participants than
a nonsocial technique (reading a written description of the
robbery with no one else present). Finally, research in infor
mation systems and other fields concerning interviews and
surveys has shown that the two techniques can yield
qualitatively different responses in a variety of contexts (see
Cooper and Schindler 2008; Sivo et al. 2005).

As noted in the “Background” section, requirements deter
mination typically involves both social and nonsocial
techniques for eliciting requirements. Our next set of hypoth
eses concerns the potential impact of these differing tech
niques on requirements when misinformation is present.

In the current study we examine requirements gathering
techniques in two ways. First, we investigate the misinfor
mation effect when misinformation is introduced and sub
sequently elicited using two elicitation techniques: (1) a
social technique (a technique that relies on social interaction

H2b:

Memory impairment explains the influence of
misinformation on belief-related requirements provided by users.

Based on the theory and findings from the psychology
literature, the demand effect is also likely to be present in the
IRD context. When the systems analyst controls the process,
users are more likely to provide answers that they believe
conform to analysts’ preferred views (Alvarez 2002; Lin and
Silva 2005; Silva and Backhouse 2003). It is possible that
users may report misinformation introduced by analysts
during IRD despite knowing that it is inconsistent with their
true knowledge or beliefs simply to conform to the perceived
expectations of the analysts or to avoid appearing to be
incompetent (see Alvarez 2002). Thus, we hypothesize that
H3a:

The demand effect explains the influence of misinformation on the accuracy of factual requirements
provided by users.

H3b:

The demand effect explains the influence of misinformation on belief-related requirements provided
by users.

between analyst and user), in this case a structured interview,
and (2) a nonsocial technique (a technique in which there is
no direct interaction between the analyst and the user), in this
case a survey. Both interviews and surveys are commonly
used in IRD processes (George et al. 2006; Kendall and
Kendall 2010). Thus, in the present study, all factors except
the source of misinformation and elicitation mode (social
versus nonsocial) will be held constant to examine whether
users are influenced more when misinformation is encoun
tered as part of an interview or when using a survey
instrument. Based on the findings in the social influence and
misinformation effect literatures, we hypothesize that
H4a:

The misinformation effect will be greater for factual
requirements provided by users when misinformation is introduced and elicited using a social
technique (interview) rather than a nonsocial technique (survey).

H4b:

The misinformation effect will be greater for beliefrelated requirements provided by users when misinformation is introduced and elicited using a social
technique (interview) rather than a nonsocial technique (survey).

Additionally, the requirements elicitation process has two
main objectives: to minimize inaccurate requirements and to
maximize accurate requirements. While we posit that social
techniques are more susceptible to the misinformation effect
and therefore more likely to produce inaccurate requirements,
it is also important to investigate whether social techniques
are more or less likely to generate accurate requirements when
misinformation is not present.
Much research supports the view that the personal nature of
social techniques such as interviews makes participants pay
more attention to the process, encourages them to think about
their responses (since they will be responding to someone and
will not want to be judged poorly by that person), and makes
them feel more accountable for their responses (see Lerner
and Tetlock 1999; Levine et al. 1993). Hence, we expect the
accuracy of requirements that were not subject to misinfor
mation to be higher with social techniques than with non
social techniques. That is, although we expect misinfor
mation to be higher with social techniques (H4a), we also
expect people to try harder and thus be more accurate con
cerning requirements about which they have received no
misinformation. This yields our final hypothesis:
H5: A social technique (interview) will result in more
accurate requirements for factual items about which
participants received no misinformation than a nonsocial
technique (survey).

This hypothesis is important to be able to make meaningful
recommendations about the selection of elicitation techniques.
With these hypotheses in mind, we now turn to the
methodology we used to test them.

Methodology
Pilot Test
Twenty students participated in a pilot test that was conducted
to (1) identify the critical items to be manipulated during the
experiment and (2) ensure that subjects understood the
instrument and were able to complete it without any prob
lems. The subjects for the pilot test were drawn from the
same population as the subjects for the subsequent experi
ment. All pilot subjects were assigned to the control con
dition. Ten students were interviewed while the other ten
were surveyed. Based on the responses of the participants to
the different factual questions and belief-related statements,
four “critical” items (two factual items and two belief-related
items) were selected for use subsequently as misinformation
for the treatment conditions in the experiment. Selection of
the critical items was based on the pilot participants’
responses. Two factual questions for which most participants
answered correctly were chosen as the two critical factual
questions. For the two belief-related critical items that were
chosen, all of the participants strongly disagreed with the
statements. That is, all of the participants rated both the
belief-related items either 1 or 2 on a seven-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree). These state
ments were then included in the treatments, discussed below,
because pilot subjects believed otherwise (as shown by their
uniformly low ratings of the items), and we were therefore
able to use these items to introduce misinformation. None of
the students reported any problems during the elicitation
session.

Subjects and Design
A total of 153 students (97 male and 56 female) enrolled in
the college of business at a large university participated in the
experiment for extra credit. Participation in the study was
voluntary. The study employed a 3 (condition: control,
memory impairment, demand effect) × 2 (requirements tech
nique: interview, survey) between-subjects design. Each
subject was randomly assigned to one of the experimental
conditions. Participants in the interview condition took part
individually, while those in the survey condition were in a
room with 7 to 10 other participants.

Procedure
Upon arrival, participants were assigned randomly to one of
the conditions and were seated in a chair in a private office or
a larger room, depending on the condition. The participants
were welcomed by an interviewer who introduced herself as
an analyst working with the university’s IT department for the
Student Information System Upgrade Project (the analyst
[interviewer] was a 26-year-old female who wore business
casual attire and conducted the interviews in a professional
manner). Because she introduced herself as an analyst,
conducted the sessions, and provided the instructions, it was
clear to participants that she was controlling the process; thus,
consistent with the theory and empirical findings noted
earlier, the demand effect was expected to be present.
This university uses a student information system that allows
students to perform a variety of tasks, such as add and drop
classes, view and print class schedules, manage accounts,
request transcripts, forward campus e-mail, and view midterm
and final grades. The system had not been upgraded for at
least four years prior to this study. All subjects participated
during a period of two weeks, and no system upgrades
occurred during this period. Students are required to register
for courses every semester using this system and also to use
the system as the primary mode for checking grades, paying
fees, purchasing parking tickets, etc. Thus, students are
appropriate participants in this study because they are regular
users of the system, have current knowledge of the system,
and have a real motivation for its improvement. The parti
cipants were asked to log in to the student information system
using their personal user name and password. A booklet con
taining instructions and a series of three short warm-up tasks
to be performed on the system were given to the participants.
None of these tasks pertained to the questions that were to be
used with the participants subsequently. This phase was
included to ensure that the participants were familiar with the
information system. All participants completed the tasks
without any problems.
The participants were then introduced to the purpose of the
session. They were told that the university and the system
developers were interested in improving the student infor
mation system and thus were interested in gathering infor
mation and opinions from students, who are the primary users
of the system. Participants did not complete consent forms
prior to the experimental sessions; they believed they were
participating in an actual system upgrade process (consent
forms are not required at this university for research exempt
from full review by the Human Subjects Committee). During
the introduction phase, the participants in the two treatment
conditions (memory impairment and demand effect) were
provided with misinformation about two factual features of

the system and two other pieces of misinformation aimed at
influencing their beliefs about the system (participants in the
control condition were not supplied with any misinforma
tion).3 These four pieces of misinformation were the critical
items referred to above. The misinformation suggested that
•

Students could pay tuition using a credit card free of
charge (whereas in fact they have to pay an additional fee
for paying tuition with a credit card)

•

The student information system is available 24 hours a
day (whereas in fact it is not available from midnight to
7:00 a.m.)

•

The student information system has a slow response time
(whereas it is generally believed to be a fast system—
confirmed during the pilot test, when pilot subjects all
strongly disagreed that it is a slow system)

•

The student information system is well utilized by the
faculty members (whereas it is generally believed that the
faculty members do not use the system effectively—
confirmed during the pilot test, during which pilot
subjects all strongly disagreed that faculty members
utilize the system effectively)4

After the introduction, participants answered demographic
questions and were asked to rate several statements aimed at
assessing their familiarity with the information system. Parti
cipants were then introduced to the last phase of the session,
which contained two sets of questions: first, there were 11
factual questions about the features of the student information
system, and, second, there were 13 questions aimed at
3
The misinformation provided concerned the “as-is” system rather than the
“to-be” system. Subjects were told explicitly that information was being
gathered about the current system to identify current potential problems so
they could be addressed in the upgrade of the system. We used the as-is
system because users are typically better at articulating information about
what they already do than they are at envisioning what a proposed system
should do. A new system involves changes of some type (typically to busi
ness processes) and causes uncertainty in the minds of users (Joshi 1991).
We believe that misinformation effects are likely to be stronger when
discussing to-be systems since users are probably less certain about the
technologies involved and will thus be more vulnerable to misinformation
introduced by analysts (and thus the results of the current study can be
considered a lower bound).
4
All of these critical items are potentially relevant to a system upgrade since
they impact usage and perceptions about the current system. Students and
faculty use the system for many purposes. Factual questions about the
current system are important because if students do not know about current
features, it may be because they do not use them or value them. Beliefrelated questions are important because of the impact of perceptions on
system usage.

gathering the beliefs of the participants regarding the func
tionality of the system. Participants answered the first set of
questions by indicating yes or no and answered the second set
of questions on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = strongly dis
agree to 7 = strongly agree). Each set of questions contained
two critical questions (noted above) that were aimed at
studying the effect of misinformation on participants’
responses. The use of two critical questions (out of 11 for
factual items and 13 for belief-related items) is consistent with
past research on the misinformation effect (e.g., Belli 1989;
Gabbert et al. 2004; Saunders and MacLeod 2002; Weingardt
et al. 1995). The introduction of too much misinformation
can raise suspicions in participants about the veracity of the
cover story.
The logic of opposition paradigm was employed to test the
memory impairment hypothesis (i.e., misinformation updates
the initial memories of subjects). Before the final recall phase
(the factual and belief-related questions), participants in this
condition were instructed that any information obtained
during the introductory phase was wrong and should not be
reported in the final memory test. Under such opposition
instructions, even if demand characteristics are in operation,
they will lead the users to prod their memories for correct
answers (Weingardt et al. 1995). Accordingly, subjects in the
memory impairment treatment condition received the fol
lowing additional instructions before answering the two sets
of questions:
To ensure that you are familiar with the XXX
system, we need to ask you some questions. For
some of the questions, the answers were not men
tioned in the introduction section. For other ques
tions, the answers were mentioned in the intro
duction section, but were described inaccurately.
There is no question on this survey for which the
correct answer was provided in the introduction.
Therefore, please answer the following questions to
the best of your ability without relying on the infor
mation provided in the introduction section.
These instructions were adapted from Lindsay (1990) to suit
the context of this study. After participants answered the two
sets of questions (concerning the fact and belief statements),
the interviewer asked them if they would like to provide any
other feedback about the system. Participants were then
asked to review the information they had provided to the
interviewer, make any changes they desired, and sign at the
end of the booklet in which the interviewer had recorded their
answers. They were then debriefed and thanked for their
participation. Sessions with participants generally lasted 20
to 25 minutes.

The participants in the survey condition followed the same
procedure but were given booklets with instructions and tasks
that they performed by themselves. They had no interaction
with the interviewer and misinformation was introduced as a
part of the introductory section in the first booklet. Partici
pants were allowed to work through the booklets at their own
pace.
All participants, regardless of treatment condition, completed
the study in three different sections. Participants in the survey
technique completed each booklet, turned it in, and received
the next booklet. Participants in the interview technique were
read the same materials in three different sections of the
interview. Thus, there was no opportunity to refer back to the
cover story or any other material during the experimental
session.

Coding
The 11-item questionnaire containing factual questions was
scored in terms of the number of neutral questions (noncritical
items) answered correctly (yielding a score of 0 to 9) and the
number of critical questions answered incorrectly (yielding a
misinformation score that ranged from 0 to 2). For the factual
questions, these numbers were added to create a misinfor
mation score for each participant, which is typical in misin
formation effect studies. For the questionnaire containing the
belief statements, however, the response numbers were not
added. Adding the ratings provided on two different belief
statements (system response time and effective use by faculty)
could result in a meaningless misinformation score and thus
lead to misinterpretation of the results, so the responses were
used individually to make within-group and between-group
comparisons.

Results
As noted, to ensure that the participants were familiar with the
information system, they were asked to rate their familiarity
on a seven-point scale that had anchors of 1 = completely
unfamiliar and 7 = completely familiar. The average rating
for this question was 5.83 (S.D. = 0.91) suggesting that the
participants believed themselves to be quite familiar with the
system. Participants were also asked to rate their response to
a question concerning how often they used the system on a
seven-point scale that had anchors of 1 = very rarely and 7 =
very often. The average rating for this question was 4.58 (S.D.
= 1.25) suggesting that the system utilized in the study is
commonly used by the participants. Since no participants
rated their use of the system as “rarely” (ratings 1 or 2), no
one’s responses were removed from the analyses.

Does the Misinformation Effect Occur
in the Context of IRD?
The misinformation scores calculated for all of the conditions
were analyzed to determine whether the misinformation effect
occurred when participants provided responses to the factual
questions. The scores were based on the number of inac
curate responses to the critical factual questions and ranged
from 0 (no inaccurate responses) to 2 (both responses were
inaccurate). The mean misinformation score was higher for
participants in the demand effect condition (mean = 1.51; S.D.
= 0.64) and in the memory impairment condition (mean =
0.94; S.D. = 0.73) than for those in the control condition
(mean = 0.35; S.D. = 0.56) (see Table 1). Univariate
ANOVA was performed to examine the differences between
the treatment conditions and the control condition for the
misinformation scores. The differences were significant
(F(2,152) = 40.493; p < 0.001) and hence H1a was supported.
Table 2 summarizes the means and standard deviations of
participants’ responses to the two critical belief statements.
On a seven-point scale ranging from 1 (totally disagree) to 7
(totally agree), participants in the control condition had lower
means, suggesting that they (correctly) disagreed with the two
critical belief statements. Participants in the treatment condi
tions had higher means, suggesting that they were influenced
by the misinformation while responding to the critical belief
statements. Multivariate ANOVA was used to analyze the
differences. The differences were significant for both beliefrelated statements (Item 1: F(2,152) = 25.92, p < 0.001; Item 2:
F(2,152) = 21.21, p < 0.001) and thus H1b was also supported.
Therefore, we conclude that the misinformation effect occurs
during requirements determination.
Since support for the misinformation effect was found in the
responses of participants to both factual questions and beliefrelated statements, further planned comparisons using the
Bonferroni procedure were made to understand what causes
the misinformation effect. The results of these comparisons
were used to test H2a, H2b, H3a, and H3b, and are discussed
in the paragraphs that follow.

Does Memory Impairment Cause
the Misinformation Effect?
Planned comparisons revealed that participants in the memory
impairment condition had a significantly higher misinfor
mation score for the factual questions than those in the control
condition (p < 0.001). Therefore, H2a (the memory impair
ment hypothesis does not explain the influence of misinfor
mation on responses to factual questions) was not supported.

We discuss this unanticipated finding in more detail below.
Participants in the memory impairment condition reported
beliefs more consistent with the misinformation introduced
earlier than those in the control condition (Item 1: p = 0.018;
Item 2: p = 0.003). Therefore H2b was supported. Based on
these findings, we conclude that memory impairment is one
of the causes of the misinformation effect in the context of
requirements elicitation.

Does the Demand Effect Cause
the Misinformation Effect?
Participants in the demand effect treatment condition had a
significantly higher misinformation score for the factual
questions than those in the control condition (p < 0.001).
Therefore, H3a (demand effect explains the influence of
misinformation on responses to factual questions) was
supported. Also, participants in the demand effect condition
reported beliefs more consistent with the misinformation
introduced than those in the control condition (Item 1: p <
0.001; Item 2: p < 0.001). Therefore H3b was also sup
ported. Further, participants in the demand effect condition
had a significantly higher misinformation score than those in
the memory impairment condition (p < 0.001) and reported
beliefs more consistent with the misinformation when com
pared to those in the memory impairment condition (Item 1:
p < 0.001; Item 2: p = 0.006). Therefore, we conclude that
(1) the demand effect is an important cause of the misinfor
mation effect, and (2) in the context of requirements elicita
tion, though memory impairment contributes to the observed
misinformation effect, the demand effect is the dominant
cause of the misinformation effect.5
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It is worth noting that we did not have an independent measure for the
demand effect, such as a question to participants about whether they
responded to items because they believed the interviewer sought or expected
that answer or whether they reported their true beliefs. Early research on the
misinformation effect (e.g., Loftus et al. 1978) included such a question on
debriefing questionnaires. However, Weinberg et al. (1983) argued that such
a question “essentially asks subjects to admit to dishonesty” (p. 102) and
therefore is a poor measure of potential demand effects. Thus, subsequent
studies typically omitted such questions and relied instead on inferences
based on the experimental design. We employed the latter procedure in the
current experiment. However, it is important to note that because we did not
have an independent measure, we cannot confirm that the theoretical
mechanism underlying participants’ responses was the demand effect. As in
many psychological studies, we infer the demand effect explanation due to
the presence of the analyst who controlled the process and the previous
literature demonstrating that participants try to conform to the perceived
expectations of the experimenter in such situations.

Table 1. Summary Statistics for Misinformation Score for Facts*
Technique
Interview

Survey

Treatment

Mean

Control

N

.27

.53

26

Demand Effect

1.73

.53

26

Memory Impairment

1.00

.75

26

Total

1.00

.85

78

.44

.58

25

Control
Demand Effect

Total

Std. Dev.

1.28

.68

25

Memory Impairment

.88

.73

25

Total

.87

.74

75

Control

.35

.56

51

1.51

.64

51

Memory Impairment

.94

.73

51

Total

.93

.80

153

Demand Effect

*Note: Misinformation score ranges from 0 to 2 with 0 referring to correct responses to both of the
critical factual questions and 2 referring to incorrect responses to both of the critical factual questions.

Table 2. Summary Statistics for Critical Belief Statements*
Treatment
Technique
Interview

Survey

Total

Belief Items

Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Item 1

Item 2

Item 1

Item 2

Control

2.46

3.65

1.39

1.85

26

Demand Effect

5.96

6.12

1.24

1.07

26

Memory
Impairment

4.58

5.50

2.02

.91

26

Total

4.33

5.09

2.14

1.70

78

Control

2.96

4.00

1.62

1.35

25

Demand Effect

4.44

5.24

1.69

1.20

25

Memory
Impairment

2.76

4.04

1.79

1.59

25

Total

3.39

4.43

1.84

1.49

75

Control

2.71

3.82

1.51

1.62

51

Demand Effect

5.22

5.69

1.65

1.21

51

Memory
Impairment

3.69

4.78

2.10

1.47

51

Total

3.87

4.76

2.05

1.63

153

*Note: Responses were on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly agree to 7 = strongly disagree)

Misinformation Effect and
Elicitation Techniques
Participants in the interview condition had a mean misin
formation score of 1.37 (S.D. = 0.74) and those in the survey
condition had a mean misinformation score of 1.08 (S.D. =
0.72). To examine whether this difference is significant, a
t-test was conducted on the data from the two treatment
conditions with elicitation technique as the independent
variable. Data from the control condition were not included
for this analysis since those participants did not receive any
misinformation.6 The difference in the misinformation score
was significant, with t(100) = 1.97; p = 0.026 (one-tailed).
Therefore, H4a was supported. That is, the misinformation
effect on factual requirements provided by users is greater
when misinformation is introduced and elicited using the
interview (social) technique than when using the survey
(nonsocial) technique.
In responding to the critical items pertaining to beliefs about
the system, participants in the interview condition had
responses more aligned with the misinformation when com
pared to those in the survey condition. Participants in the
interview condition had mean responses of 5.27 and 5.81
(S.D. = 1.81 and 1.03) to the two critical items while those in
the survey condition had mean responses of 3.60 and 4.64
(S.D. = 1.92 and 1.52) to the two critical items. Results of
multivariate ANOVA showed that the differences were
significant (Item 1: F(1,101) = 20.51, p < 0.001; Item 2: F(1,101)
= 20.74, p < 0.001). Therefore, H4b was also supported.

Elicitation Techniques and Facts Not
Subject to Misinformation
To test whether the interview elicitation technique yielded
more accurate answers than the survey technique for facts not
subject to misinformation, we utilized participants’ responses
to the nine neutral questions relating to facts about the student
information system. Responses to each of these questions
were coded as 1 (correct response) or 0 (incorrect response).
The total number of correct responses provided to the neutral
questions formed each participant’s accuracy score.
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Because the control condition was not included in this analysis, the mean
values for the tests in this section do not appear in Tables 1 and 2. The mean
values were calculated from the means for the demand effect and memory
impairment treatments within each technique (interview and survey). For
example, for the interview technique for the factual questions, the mean can
be calculated in a shorthand fashion as follows: (1.73 + 1.00)/2 = 1.37
(addition of the treatment means and division by 2 is possible since N is equal
for the two treatments).

A t-test was performed comparing the accuracy scores for the
two groups, interview (mean = 8.71, S.D. = .54) and survey
(mean = 7.98, S.D. = .89). The resulting difference was
highly significant (t(100) = 5.05; p < .0001). Thus, the social
interview technique yielded more accurate responses to the
items not subject to misinformation than the nonsocial survey
technique, supporting H5. Table 3 provides a summary of the
hypotheses and results.

Discussion
Threats to the accuracy of requirements are of fundamental
concern in IRD. We have addressed the threat of misinfor
mation on requirements accuracy in this study by focusing on
three main issues: Does the misinformation effect occur in
the context of gathering requirements about facts and beliefs?
If the misinformation effect does occur, what is the under
lying mechanism that causes it? Does the requirements
gathering technique of interviewing make users more vulner
able to the misinformation effect than the survey technique?
This section provides a discussion of these three main issues
in terms of both theoretical and practical implications.

Implications for Theory
Significant differences between responses of the participants
in the control and treatment conditions to critical items estab
lished that the misinformation effect occurs during IRD.
Misinformation introduced by the analyst influenced users’
responses to both factual and belief-related questions irrespec
tive of the elicitation technique employed. The results reveal
a new perspective concerning the accuracy of requirements
that has not been generally recognized. That is, one reason
for inaccurate requirements given by users is likely misinfor
mation provided by analysts.
Further, support for H3a and H3b demonstrates that an
important cause of the misinformation effect in the context of
IRD is the demand effect. Participants in the demand effect
treatment condition performed significantly worse than the
other participants. They had a significantly higher misinfor
mation score for factual information and they aligned their
beliefs more closely to the misinformation than participants in
the other conditions. Further analysis revealed that although
memory impairment explains the misinformation effect in
IRD, the demand effect provides a stronger explanation. Such
patterns were also found when comparing responses of parti
cipants for a given elicitation technique. Therefore, we con
clude that the misinformation effect in the context of IRD is

Table 3. Hypotheses and Results Summary
Hypotheses

Test Employed

Supported/Not Supported

Between Group Comparisons
H1a: In responding to factual questions, users who have
received misinformation from analysts are more likely to
provide inaccurate answers than those who did not
receive any misinformation.

ANOVA
F(2,152) = 40.49; p < 0.001

Supported

H1b: In responding to belief-related statements, users
who have received misinformation from analysts are
more likely to provide responses that are aligned with the
misinformation than those who did not receive any
misinformation.

MANOVA
Item 1: F(2,152) = 25.92; p < 0.001
Item 2: F(2,152) = 21.21; p < 0.001

Supported

H2a: Memory impairment does not explain the
influence of misinformation on the accuracy of factual
requirements provided by users.

Pairwise Comparisons
p < 0.001

Not Supported

H2b: Memory impairment explains the influence of
misinformation on the accuracy of belief related
requirements provided by users.

Pairwise Comparisons
Item 1: p = 0.018
Item 2: p = 0.003

Supported

H3a: Demand effect explains the influence of misinformation on the accuracy of factual requirements provided
by users.

Pairwise Comparisons
p < 0.001

Supported

H3b: Demand effect explains the influence of misinformation on the belief related requirements provided by
users.

Pairwise Comparisons
Item 1: p < 0.001
Item 2: p < 0.001

Supported

H4a: Misinformation effect on factual requirements
provided by users will be greater when misinformation is
introduced and elicited using social techniques
(interviews) rather than non-social techniques (surveys).
H4b: Misinformation effect on belief related responses
provided by users will be greater when misinformation is
introduced and elicited using social techniques
(interviews) rather than non-social techniques (surveys).

T-Test
t(100) = 1.97; p = 0.026

Supported

MANOVA
Item 1: F(1,101) = 20.51; p < 0.001
Item 2: F(1,101) = 20.74; p < 0.001

Supported

H5: Social techniques (interviews) will result in more
accurate requirements (for factual items) about which
participants received no misinformation than nonsocial
techniques (surveys).

T-Test
t(100) = 5.05; p < .0001

Supported

primarily due to the demand effect and is further magnified by
genuine memory impairment.

the process of user participation and hence cannot derive
benefits from it.

These findings provide an integrative theoretical framework
for understanding previous work on user–analyst communi
cation. As noted, some research has demonstrated that user
participation improves requirements determination and system
success (Hunton and Beeler 1997; Hwang and Thorn 1999;
Newman and Sabherwal 1996), but findings on the influence
of user participation have been equivocal. The misinfor
mation effect may be one important contingency factor that
helps explain the differing findings. If analysts intentionally
or unintentionally introduce misinformation, they undermine

Lack of support for H2a provides an important perspective on
the misinformation effect. We hypothesized that the influence
of misinformation on responses to factual questions would not
be caused by memory impairment since it is unlikely that
memories for factual knowledge gained over a period of time
will change with the introduction of misinformation. For
example, if a user has seen a feature of a system over and over
again, it is unlikely that he will believe misinformation intro
duced that contradicts his factual knowledge. However, this
hypothesis was not supported; factual knowledge learned over

a period of time was impacted. This finding should be of
considerable concern for all systems development stake
holders. To attempt to understand the finding further and be
able to suggest potential mitigating strategies, we conducted
additional exploratory analysis. Multiple comparisons
revealed that among the participants interviewed, participants
in the memory impairment condition had significantly higher
misinformation scores than those in the control condition
(p = 0.001). However, among the surveyed participants, there
was no significant difference in the misinformation scores for
factual questions for those participants in the control condi
tion and the memory impairment condition (p = 0.242). These
additional findings provide important insights. Factual
knowledge learned over time was not affected by memory
impairment when a survey instrument was utilized, and the
misinformation effect did not occur, but memory impairment
and the misinformation effect did occur when interviews were
utilized. This finding illustrates additional concerns about the
impact of interviews on accuracy of recall. We discuss
potential mitigating strategies later in this section.
Support for H2b demonstrates that irrespective of the tech
nique employed, the memory impairment hypothesis explains
the misinformation effect observed in the responses of users
to statements of beliefs. As we discuss below, particular care
must be taken in elicitation procedures to ensure that sugges
tive misleading information is not introduced and to be certain
that users’ true beliefs are assessed.
Support for H4a and H4b suggests an important implication
concerning the choice of elicitation techniques. Although
interviews conducted with different people are often stan
dardized, it is important to acknowledge that standardization
lies on a continuum. At one end, strict standardization is
expressed by adherence to prescribed rules and with little
flexibility for the interviewer, regardless of the characteristics
of the situation. At the other end, interviewer autonomy is
evidenced by flexibility in applying a more limited set of
rules. The latter is often utilized in cases in which the inter
viewer needs to clarify a number of factors with the parti
cipant. In fact, one of the most important advantages of using
the interview technique is the conversational flexibility it
provides (Suchman and Jordan 1990). However, this flexi
bility has both strengths and weaknesses. Interviewer probing
can help users understand requests more fully and produce
accurate answers, but interviewers can also introduce infor
mation that leads users to give inaccurate or unintended
responses (Conrad and Schober 1996). Findings of the pre
sent study demonstrate that interviews make users more
susceptible to misinformation when compared to surveys. In
fact, we may have established a powerful boundary condition
since probing was not even performed in the current study (if
probing had been performed, it would have provided more

opportunities for the introduction of misinformation by the
analyst). Thus, it is not just misinformation per se that dis
torts users’ responses; rather, the medium by which misinfor
mation is introduced and elicited also has an impact on the
magnitude of the misinformation effect. With the social elic
itation technique, the effect of misinformation on users’
responses is stronger.
However, the results of H5 demonstrate that the social tech
nique of interviewing leads to higher accuracy of responses to
neutral questions (participants in the interview condition were
more accurate than participants in the survey condition for
neutral factual items). Together, the results of H4 and H5
show that interviews lead users to be less accurate for ques
tions about which they have received misinformation (and
thus more susceptible to the misinformation effect) when
compared to surveys, but more accurate in their responses to
factual questions about which they have received no misin
formation. The latter, consistent with the theory presented
earlier, was presumably a result of greater focus, a stronger
feeling of accountability, and trying harder to please the
experimenter. On the other hand, surveys lead users to less
accurate responses to factual questions about which they have
received no misinformation but greater accuracy for misin
formation items. In the survey condition, we speculate that
the ability to read questions several times and reflect upon
them may have led to more accurate answers to the misinfor
mation items, but the lack of social influence (no experi
menter present) did not provide the extra motivation to answer
the neutral items correctly. This explanation concerning the
survey condition is, however, an empirical question.
Thus, the findings from H4 and H5 suggest an important
dilemma when it comes to choosing an elicitation technique.
Removing interviews from the process reduces the likelihood
of analyst-introduced misinformation (although it should be
noted that the wording of questions on a survey can also
introduce misinformation). Since surveys seem relatively
resistant to the misinformation effect, research concerning
ways of making them more effective in IRD is important. Our
findings provide another reason for using multiple techniques
during IRD. Analysts might compare the differences in
requirements gathered through interviews and surveys and
analyze whether the differences are genuine or are caused by
misinformation introduced during the process. Further
research into this important dilemma is warranted.
Theoretical implications also exist for alternative forms of
requirements gathering. Systems development methods are
constantly evolving, and agile methodologies have recently
become more widely used. Agile methodologies emphasize
an incremental and iterative approach to systems development
and thus to requirements elicitation (Boehm 2002; Lee and

Xia 2010). Each iteration of a system or system component
yields a workable output to which users can provide feedback
(Baskerville and Pries-Heje 2004). In theory, this approach
could reduce misinformation effects that may have occurred
during the requirements elicitation process by providing more
opportunities for feedback and greater interaction between
analysts and users. However, we believe that iterative
development will not eliminate the misinformation effect.
First, demand effects will still be present and perhaps will be
stronger because agile methodologies demand trust among
team members and compromise when it comes to deciding
which features are important and which are not. Such an
environment may make it easier for analysts to influence
users’ preferences intentionally or unintentionally. Also, a
prototype developed by an analyst is a much stronger signal
than a textual or verbal suggestion. If an analyst presents a
user with a prototype, the user is likely to perceive the proto
type as demonstrating the analyst’s “expertise” and as a signal
that the analyst believes it to be a good solution. This is
likely to induce a demand effect. Second, memory impair
ment indicates that the original knowledge or belief of the
user is “overwritten,” in which case the original memory is
lost and cannot be retrieved even with several iterations.
Thus, it seems likely that the misinformation effect will not be
eliminated with iterative development techniques. However,
this is an empirical question worthy of investigation.
The present research also contributes to theory concerning the
misinformation effect in several important ways. As men
tioned in the “Introduction” section, the presence of the
misinformation effect when dealing with facts and beliefs
learned by people over time through experience has not, to
our knowledge, been tested before in any context. We found
that both types of information were susceptible to the misin
formation effect, extending the impact of the effect from the
traditional contexts of eyewitness testimony and auto
biographical events to contexts in which people have wellestablished knowledge structures in place. The fact that both
experientially learned information and beliefs are impacted by
the misinformation effect demonstrates the generality of the
phenomenon and opens many additional avenues of research
in requirements elicitation and human memory more
generally. We have also contributed to an improved under
standing of the misinformation effect by providing the first
test of the phenomenon when information was both intro
duced and elicited using social (interview) and nonsocial
(survey) techniques.7 As noted, our findings demonstrate the
7

As noted earlier, Gabbert et al. (2004) elicited information using social (a
confederate) and nonsocial (a narrative) techniques but did not introduce the
misinformation using social techniques. Their experiment used the standard
video clip stimulus in the eyewitness memory paradigm and introduced
misinformation using written narratives for all conditions. Our study extends
and expands upon the findings of Gabbert et al. (2004).

increased impact of the misinformation effect but also the
increased accuracy for neutral factual items in interview
settings. Our findings suggest that the magnitude of the
misinformation effect in traditional contexts such as eye
witness testimony may be even greater if social elicitation
techniques are utilized (and thus greater precautions should be
taken to prevent the effect from impacting testimony).
Further research on these differences is warranted. Thus, the
present research adds significantly to the theory concerning
the misinformation effect.

Implications for Practice
Several important implications for practice are suggested by
this research. One of the major problems likely to result from
the misinformation effect is that organizations develop
systems that do not meet their requirements. They may pay
for features they do not need, find that systems they develop
are not compatible with their existing systems or business
processes, or discover that requirements were omitted that
would have been useful for the organization. These implica
tions suggest that alerting both systems analysts and project
managers to the possibility of the misinformation effect, and
using strategies to minimize the effect, are important practical
prescriptions.
As noted above, choice of elicitation technique is an impor
tant concern given the relative strengths and weaknesses of
interviews and surveys for the accuracy of information
provided by users. If analysts utilize interviews, they need to
take measures to minimize introduction of the demand effect
during requirements elicitation. For example, using ethnog
raphers trained in remaining neutral during requirements
elicitation could be useful in reducing the demand effect as
long as users do not regard them as systems development
experts (Smith and Ellsworth 1987). Further, probing using
neutral questions, using feedback only to reward complete
responses (not the content of responses), and not providing
cues to users about how they should respond (Fowler 2009)
could significantly reduce the misinformation effect.
Analysts should also be careful when discussing opinions or
indicating stances on topics during the early stages of eliciting
requirements. Although part of natural discourse between
people, such information may inappropriately influence or
mislead users. At some point, the analyst typically must bring
his knowledge of systems design into conversations with
users to ensure feasibility of options and to manage user
expectations appropriately. However, this intertwining of
analysis and design should ideally be left until as late in the
elicitation process as possible. In addition to unintentional
introduction of misinformation, it may also be difficult to

control for misinformation introduced intentionally by
analysts. From an organizational standpoint, it may be
desirable to use surveys for at least some portion of the IRD
process, since both intentional and unintentional introduction
of misinformation can be reduced with surveys.
An argument can be made that judicious use of misinfor
mation by analysts may lead to some positive outcomes. For
example, analysts may provide inaccurate cues (intentionally
or unintentionally) that cause users to think of ideas or
alternatives or ways of looking at problems that they had not
thought of before. Analysts may also intentionally employ
misinformation to control “requirements creep,” in which the
size of the project grows because of continual additions of
new requirements (especially ones not absolutely necessary)
by users. In such a case, analysts may misinform users about
constraints that limit such requirements. Analysts may also
intentionally provide misinformation to keep a project on
schedule or on budget, which potentially adds value to the
organization. However, in addition to ethical considerations
involved in intentionally delivering misinformation, there are
broader implications for systems development. For example,
who should have the ultimate power to decide upon and/or
limit requirements? If analysts use their expertise to mislead
users into, say, believing that certain requirements cannot be
fulfilled, is this in the best interests of the organization?
Does this tilt the power too far toward the IS group and away
from users? These are both philosophical and practical ques
tions that do not have easy answers.
Another practical issue is that the nature of “users” has
changed in some ways over the past few years. For example,
users may in some instances be characterized more accurately
as “clients”—customers, potential customers, or suppliers—
who may exert considerable control over the systems devel
opment process in general and requirements determination in
particular (e.g., Gulliksen et al. 2003; Kirsch et al. 2002;
Mouakket et al. 1994). Specific examples include companies
(the users) that have outsourced or off-shored systems devel
opment work to other firms (the analysts) (e.g., Sakthivel
2007) and retailers such as Wal-Mart that directly influence
aspects of the systems development of companies that supply
them (e.g., Angeles 2005). In such cases, clients may have
substantial influence over the requirements elicitation process.
However, even when user-clients direct the process, the
analyst remains the person who must ultimately understand
and model the requirements to build the system. He thus
retains some de facto control over the process in such cases.
From a practical standpoint, the misinformation effect may
still occur during analyst–user communication and negotiation
processes despite these different systems development condi
tions. With off-shoring, there may be the opportunity for

misinformation (intentional or unintentional) to be introduced
due to cultural differences and the physical distance between
the analysts and clients. With outsourcing, technical expertise
may be leveraged by the outsourcing firm to introduce
misinformation as part of increasing sales of features or
system modules. Thus, contemporary systems development
practice, with its more diverse forms, still requires its actors
to be vigilant concerning the misinformation effect.
It also may be argued that flaws in information requirements
caused by the misinformation effect can be corrected by other
steps or strategies in the systems development process. It is
possible that structural strategies (such as asking users or
analysts to play devil’s advocate or using more experienced
users) or JAD sessions may make the misinformation effect
less likely to occur, or that the requirements verification
process (prior to design) or prototyping or testing may expose
inaccurate requirements. These are all empirical questions at
this point. We note, however, that if misinformation is
introduced, memory impairment can cause the original infor
mation to be overwritten, so it cannot be recalled later
regardless of technique or number of iterations. And, as
noted, demand effects will also make the misinformation
effect difficult to overcome.

Limitations and Future Research
The present study has investigated the misinformation effect
as a central issue in requirements elicitation efforts. Since
this is the first study to address this issue, there are some
limitations that should be discussed. However, given the
presence of the misinformation effect in this context, the
limitations of this study can also serve as fertile ground for
further research. Participants in this study were regular users
of the system, but were not domain experts. Participants in
actual IRD contexts may have differing levels of experience
and/or expertise (they may have more or may have less than
our participants), which may affect the results obtained.
Therefore, examining whether experience and expertise
moderate the influence of misinformation on the accuracy of
requirements gathered could have important implications for
participant selection strategies for IRD. Also, this study did
not investigate whether the misinformation effect is temporary
or permanent. If the effect is temporary, there may be miti
gating strategies analysts can employ, such as introducing
breaks during requirements elicitation sessions or gathering
requirements over multiple sessions. However, there is evi
dence from other contexts that the misinformation effect is not
temporary (e.g., Marsh et al. 2003), which would be expected
considering that memory impairment is one of its causes.
And, given that the demand effect is also an important cause,

the misinformation effect seems unlikely to disappear in IRD.
Further, it is also worth noting that beliefs may be more or
less malleable. We did not measure strength of beliefs in the
present research, but since our results suggest that both facts
and beliefs are influenced by demand effects and memory
impairment, strength of belief may make no difference.
However, investigating the misinformation effect with more
strongly held beliefs than those in the current study represents
an interesting area for future research.
Another important consideration is that the motivation levels
of different organizational stakeholders are likely to range
from quite low to quite high under various circumstances.
Users whose jobs or work processes will change significantly
may have higher motivation and greater focus than people
whose work is peripherally affected. Analysts working on
higher priority systems development efforts may have higher
motivation. And systems that are critical to the mission or
survival of the organization should command greater attention
and focus than other systems. The system used in this study
was not one for which failure would result in disastrous
consequences. Although the student participants are real
users of this system and have a stake in its proper functioning
and planned upgrades, it must be acknowledged that both
users and analysts may have greater motivation for a system
controlling users’ personal security or one ensuring the proper
functioning of a nuclear power plant. In the present study,
because of the random assignment of participants, we can
assume that any motivational differences in participants were
distributed evenly across treatment groups. Nonetheless,
future research investigating the impact of motivations of
organizational stakeholders on the misinformation effect in
IRD would be valuable.
We also acknowledge that there is more complexity in the
accuracy of requirements using interviews and surveys than
we have captured in the present research. For example, users
responding to questions from an interviewer often do not have
the luxury of thinking carefully and deliberately about a
response before providing an answer. In addition, they are
not likely to ask the analyst (interviewer) to repeat the ques
tion on numerous occasions. In contrast, as noted above,
users responding to a survey may both think carefully and
reread questions (although whether they do so in requirements
elicitation settings is an empirical question). In the present
study, this factor may help explain the findings that surveys
are somewhat more robust to the misinformation effect.
An important area for future research concerns misinfor
mation introduced into the IRD process by users. Although
we focused on analysts in the current research, users are
typically the content experts for software applications and

analysts must rely on them for accurate requirements.
Misinformation introduced by users, either intentionally or
unintentionally, is therefore a threat to requirements accuracy
and successful systems development. For example, Gallivan
and Keil (2003) and Markus and Benjamin (1997) discuss
numerous reasons that users are not motivated to provide
accurate requirements, including not wanting to challenge
strong organizational assumptions and providing feedback on
minor technical issues to mask their true desire not to change
their work processes. Thus, understanding user-introduced
misinformation represents an important area for future
investigations.
Future research can also examine additional causes of the
demand effect. In the present research we investigated the
demand effect as it has traditionally been used in the psych
ology literature, in this case as a consequence of attempting
to meet the expectations of an analyst who was in control of
the process. In addition to this cause, there may be other
factors that can induce the demand effect. For example,
another potential factor is the perceived technical expertise of
the analyst. Users may agree with the analyst’s suggestions
during IRD because they view the analyst as an expert in
systems development (see Lin and Silva 2005). In the context
of eyewitness memory Smith and Ellsworth (1987) found that
misinformation decreased witness accuracy when the ques
tioner was assumed by the subject to be knowledgeable about
the crime, but had no effect on accuracy when the questioner
was assumed to be naïve. Thus, if a systems analyst is
perceived as particularly knowledgeable concerning the topic
of interest, users may provide requirements consistent with
those suggested by the analyst. Therefore, the results of the
current experiment may underrepresent a typical demand
effect when compared to traditional IS development settings.
In organizational settings in which there is a larger perceived
technical expertise gap between users and analysts, the likeli
hood of analyst-introduced misinformation is expected to be
higher. This is an empirical question worthy of additional
research.

Conclusion
The present study has demonstrated that the misinformation
effect is a significant threat to the accuracy of requirements
gathered for organizational systems. We have extended
misinformation effect theory by showing the impact of the
effect on factual and belief-related information learned
experientially over time, and have found that misinformation
introduced by analysts during IRD negatively influences the
accuracy of requirements elicited. The misinformation effect
is thus central to our understanding of requirements elicita

tion. If information gathered is not accurate, the IRD process
will fail and the misinformation will negatively affect the
success of the full systems development and implementation
process. We have introduced a new theoretical perspective to
understand why requirements provided by users may not
reflect their true knowledge or beliefs. It is important to
realize that if analysts introduce misinformation during the
requirements elicitation process, the requirements gathered
are likely to be a reflection of what the analysts suggest rather
than the true requirements of the users. Further research into
this important area of systems development is warranted.
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